In his 1947 British Academy lecture on Naturalistic Ethics, Mr. W. F. R. Hardie is concerned to ask himself whether a naturalistic theory of ethics can give a “satisfactory account of our moral knowledge or convictions,” or whether some form of non-naturalism is demanded by our moral experience. It will be remembered that after a careful sifting and examination of certain features of our moral knowledge or convictions, Mr. Hardie suspends judgment between naturalism and non-naturalism, observing that “on the one (...) hand philosophers who start from the ostensible facts of our moral experience and thinking, and are most careful and accurate in their rendering of these facts, have tended to be led to objectivist and anti-naturalistic conclusions. Where they least carry conviction is in the moral epistemology which they assume or defend. When we reflect, with the epistemological issue in mind, on the actual process in ourselves of moral reflection and decision, we are more inclined to sympathize with a ‘moral sentiment’ theory than we ought to be if the rationalists are wholly in the right.” In what follows I wish to consider another feature of our moral experience which Mr. Hardie did not examine in his lecture and which appears to be of considerable importance, namely the situation where, to put it very roughly for the moment, we find ourselves at variance with another person or persons on a moral issue, where, for instance, I hold that a certain course of conduct is right, and the other person or persons hold that it is wrong, or vice versa , and where further we may pursue divergent courses of action accordingly. I wish to ask myself whether the naturalistic commentary on this situation of ethical disagreement is altogether satisfactory when we consider it in the light of “the ostensible facts of our moral experience and thinking,” whether, in fact, to use another phrase of Mr. Hardie's, it squares altogether with “our fundamental moral convictions” in regard to such a situation. The naturalistic commentary with which I am primarily concerned is that which is now sometimes labelled “the emotive theory of ethics,” and is to be found admirably developed, for example, in Professor Stevenson's book Ethics and Language. (shrink)

The case for God -- Possibilities -- The illusion of Descartes -- Self-creation, part 1 -- Self-creation, part 2 -- Self-existence -- Necessary being -- The God of the Bible vs. the God of philosophy -- Kant's moral argument -- Vanity of vanities -- The psychology of atheism.

The manuscripts of Harriot discussed in this paper are essentially rough notes marginal to his systematic treatment of algebra, of which a small part was published posthumously. The central theme is the sign-rule for multiplication; but the incidentals open up an aspect of symbolism in mathematics entirely new for the time. A more restricted aspect of the same theme was touched on by Commandino in his Euclid, quoted by Harriot as rightly blaming ‘those that thinke that minus per minus shal (...) produce plus’; Commandino's authority was Cardano, in a similarly marginal departure from his great Ars magna, the de Aliza, which Harriot also cites in the same reference. The ostensible motivation, to preserve intact the Euclidean tradition in geometry, plays a very minor role in Harriot's notes. The basic aim, to elude the fatal link with imaginaries, they do touch on. More dimly underlying the arguments are the crucial logical facets of the problem, which Harriot faced with a greater conceptual clarity, formulating in words, however, only his own conclusion: the choice of sign-rule is the user's—a fact not fully recognised by mathematicians generally until the 19th century. (shrink)

Papers presented in a National Seminar on "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language", held in Feb. 24-26, 1999, at Hyderabad, India.

The article sets out aspects of locke's theory of personal identity which were seen by contemporaries to be not only fallacious but also to conflict with christian doctrine regarding the soul. A modified theory is then educed, From berkeley, Butler, William law and other divines, Which avoids these fallacies, Is epistemologically more rigorous and arguably expressed christian doctrine more accurately. This is seen as a forerunner of some central concerns of romantic theology.

The metaphorical nature of biological language is examined and the use of metaphors for providing the linguistic context in which similarities and differences are made is described. Certain pervasive metaphors which are characterised by systemic properties are noted, and in order to provide some focus to the study, systemic metaphors associated with machine, text and organism are discussed. Other systemic metaphors such as society and circuit are also reported. Some details concerning interrelations between automaton and organism are presented in the (...) light of the previous discussion.An approach towards the analysis of biosystem metaphors is outlined which relates part-whole, organisational level and systemic metaphors in a single model. Examples are provided throughout the discussion and mainly come from computing. The potential for metaphorical transfers between these domains is considered. (shrink)

The problem that confronts us when we try to compare the structure of discourse and explanation in different domains of knowledge is that no one is an insider in more than one field, and insider information is essential. An observer who is not immersed in the practice of a particular scholarship and who wants to understand it is at the mercy of the practitioners. Yet those practitioners are themselves mystified by a largely unexamined communal myth of how scholarship is carried (...) on. R. G. Collingwood, although primarily a philosopher, was immersed in the community of historians and understood how history is done, so that he has had an immense influence on our ideas about historiography. Every historian knows The Idea of History.1 He was also a metaphysician, yet his influence on scientists’ understanding of nature, and of science, has been nil, and it is a rare scientist indeed who has ever heard of Collingwood or read The Idea of Nature.2 Collingwood’s views of the structure of science had to be constructed in large part from the elaborate fictions created by scientists and by an earlier generation of philosophers and historians of science who participated in the Baconian myth of the hypothetical-deductive scheme. 1. See R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History .2. See Collingwood, The Idea of Nature . R. C. Lewontin is Alexander Agassiz Professor at Harvard University. He is an experimental and theoretical evolutionary geneticist who has also worked extensively on epistemological issues in biology. He is the author of The Genetic Basis of Evolutionary Change and, with Richard Levins, of The Dialectical Biologist . His current research concerns the nature of genetic variation among individuals within species. (shrink)

We suggest that the cerebellum generates sensory or estimates based on outgoing motor commands and sensory feedback. Thus, it is not a motor pattern generator (HOUK et al.) but a predictive system which is intimately involved in motor behavior. This theory may explain the sensitivity of the climbing fibers to both unexpected external events and motor errors (SIMPSON et al.), and we speculate that unusual biophysical properties of the inferior olive might allow the cerebellum to develop multiple asynchronous sensory estimates, (...) [HOUK et al.; SIMPSON et al.; THACH]. (shrink)